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The political situation in Ukraine is determined primarily by the ongoing war, and the situation 
of stalemate at the front is raising the level of public impatience. President Petro Poroshenko 
has consolidated the overwhelming majority of power in his hands, but he is not using it to 
fulfil his election promises; rather he is focused on strengthening his position. The significant 
weakening of the People’s Front, the coalition partner of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, as well as 
the majority of opposition parties has contributed significantly to this state of affairs. Prime 
Minister Volodymyr Hroysman remains dependent on the head of state, although he has grad-
ually been strengthening his own political position. This has been accompanied by an increase 
in the importance of the Presidential Administration and the apparatus of the state, whose 
staff follow the President’s lead. We may also note a rise in the importance of the interior min-
ister Arsen Avakov, who is also building up his own political position while remaining in the 
shadows. The political determination of the organisations of veterans of the war in Donbas is 
also noticeable, as is that of the nationalists. Moreover, preparations for the 2019 presidential 
and parliamentary elections are becoming increasingly important The president’s team are 
primarily focused on preventing the emergence of any new significant political forces which 
could threaten the balance of power created after the Revolution of Dignity. It seems that 
there will be no dissolution of the parliament or change of government in the coming months, 
a factor which will deepen the present stagnation of the process of reforming the country.
War fatigue
Three years after the outbreak of the war in the 
Donbas, and two since the Minsk agreement 
which froze the situation at the front, public 
impatience and antipathy towards the govern-
ment are rising, with the latter being blamed 
(not without reason) for reaping the benefits of 
the ongoing situation of ‘neither war nor peace’. 
The mood of Ukrainian society, including its polit-
ical elites, is closely related to the situation around 
the Donbas, which has pushed dissatisfaction 
with the deterioration of living conditions into 
the background, and is expressed by an almost 
total lack of protest at the economic situation.
Support is growing among the political class 
for the recognition of the separatist ‘republics’ 
as occupied territories, and even for breaking 
off all economic cooperation and diplomatic 
relations with the Russian Federation. In mid-
March, President Poroshenko decided to au-
thorise a ‘social’ blockade of trade with the 
separatist part of the Donbas, which had been 
launched by veterans’ militias.
The Ukrainian elites are generally opposed to 
both the implementation of the Minsk agree-
ment and any surrender or moves towards 
peace at all costs. Fatigue at the war and the 
severe losses have produced ever more rad-
ical rhetoric, including a readiness to support 
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a possible new attempt to liquidate the ‘repub-
lics’ by force. In addition, the armed forces are 
feeling more and more confident; they are both 
morally and organisationally ready to engage 
in offensive activities, although their command 
must be aware that once they gain the upper 
hand over the separatist forces, regular Russian 
units will rejoin the fighting.
Among civil society organisations, there is in-
creasing opposition to leading politicians and 
entrepreneurs using the war as a pretext to 
abandon or slow down reforms, especially 
those targeted against corruption and the pro-
cess of so-called de-oligarchisation, for which 
there is huge social demand.
The presidential camp and its allies
In April 2016, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatse- 
nyuk, a strong and independent politician, 
and leader of the People’s Front party, was re-
placed by Volodymyr Hroysman, a close asso-
ciate of Poroshenko who had little experience 
in national politics. In this way, the President 
of Ukraine became the main political player in 
the country. Poroshenko has skilfully exploit-
ed his wide-ranging prerogatives (such as his 
influence on the armed forces and the pub-
lic prosecutor’s office), but he has sometimes 
also acted at the fringe of legality; for exam-
ple, he blocked the election of new members 
to the Central Electoral Commission (this body 
currently lacks a valid quorum, which prevents 
it from taking important decisions/choices).
The Presidential Administration has become the 
principal location for conducting political and 
economic interests, weakening the role of the 
government (which had been much greater 
during Yatsenyuk’s premiership) and the par-
liament. The role of the Presidential Adminis-
tration in the state has not been so great since 
Leonid Kuchma’s second term.
Initially regarded as merely the president’s tool, 
Prime Minister Hroysman quickly gained a rel-
atively independent position, often opposing 
suggestions and pressures from the officials of 
the Presidential Administration, and he is now 
striving for the status of ‘junior partner’ to the 
head of state. His position has been strength-
ened by the fact that the current parliament 
has been unable to elect a new prime minis-
ter; thus Hroysman’s resignation would lead to 
early elections. 14 April marked one year since 
parliament’s approval of the government’s pro-
gramme, after which point it would have been 
theoretically possible to dismiss the govern-
ment, but this should not be expected, for the 
reasons stated above.
The Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP) has become 
another ‘government party’, which has no po-
litical programme, but instead represents the 
interests of the state apparatus (at both cen-
tral and local levels), the importance of which 
is rising both in relation to the conduct of the 
war and a certain weakening of the political 
role of the oligarchs. The few activists of the 
Revolution of Dignity who won parliamentary 
mandates on the BPP list have no influence on 
party politics, and are increasingly acting as if 
they were in opposition.
The president and his team have been boost-
ed by the weakening of the BPP’s parliamenta-
ry coalition partner, the People’s Front, which 
currently has around 1-2% of support in the 
polls. This grouping has never formed a coher-
ent party, but consists of several groups fo-
cused around its strongest politicians, includ-
ing Yatsenyuk and the interior minister Arsen 
The Ukrainian elites are generally op-
posed to both the implementation of 
the Minsk agreement and any surren-
der or moves towards peace at all costs. 
Fatigue at the war and the severe losses 
have produced ever more radical rhetoric.
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Avakov; Andriy Parubiy, the speaker of parlia-
ment, clearly has no ambition to play a politi-
cal role corresponding to the formal position of 
the ‘number two’ in the state. The aim of the 
People’s Front is now to survive, in the hope 
of rebuilding voter confidence as the memory 
of Yatsenyuk’s rule fades.
The People’s Front remains in the coalition 
mainly to prevent early elections; breaking 
off its cooperation with the BPP would make 
such a step inevitable. The former prime min-
ister’s party retains significant influence within 
the state apparatus (including on state-owned 
companies), and also has an extensive party 
structure which could play a major role in both 
the election campaigns scheduled for 2019. 
Thus, the weakening of Yatsenyuk’s party, 
or (the currently unrealistic) subordination of 
its structure to the president, would be in the 
latter’s interests.
Arsen Avakov, who has been interior minister 
since February 2014, earned great credit in the 
first phase of the war, by sponsoring the vol-
unteer battalions among other things. He is 
undoubtedly the leader of the informal ‘war 
party’, as well as co-leader of the People’s Front 
alongside Yatsenyuk; he may well become 
a strong candidate for the presidency.1 As such, 
he poses a threat both to Poroshenko and to 
Yatsenyuk, although neither of them can open-
ly oppose him, in order not to bring about the 
breakup of the People’s Front, which at present 
would be unfavourable to both politicians.
1 At present Avakov is not seen as a potential candidate, 
and as such has not been listed in opinion polls (in De-
cember 2016, the main candidates, Poroshenko and 
Yulia Tymoshenko, were each supported by about 15% 
of respondents who declared their readiness to vote). 
http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obschestven-
no-politicheskaya_situaciya_v_ukraine.html, accessed 
13 March 2017
The situation of the opposition
The opposition parties have been finding it hard 
to pull themselves together in the present sit-
uation, and are committed to maintaining the 
status quo, and above all to freezing the par-
ty scene in its present form. Yulia Tymoshenko 
hopes to once again lead any mass opposition 
to the government’s policies (and to provoke any 
such protests in the future), but for now she is 
not taking any steps in this direction, confining 
herself to demagogic speeches in parliament 
and the media. Meanwhile Oleh Lyashko’s Rad-
ical Party is increasingly clearly working (unoffi-
cially) with the presidential camp, although this 
has not stopped Lyashko from using populist 
rhetoric, directed at the President among others.
The Opposition Bloc is engulfed in apathy: its 
leadership is clearly unable to learn the lessons 
of the past three years’ events, nor to identify 
whose interests it should now represent: those 
of the shrinking pro-Russian electorate, of Rinat 
Akhmetov or of Dmitro Firtash. The withdrawal 
of Firtash (one of the leading oligarchs) from 
Ukrainian politics has significantly weakened 
the party and undermined the position of the 
politicians leading it, who were close associates 
of the oligarch.
Of the oligarchic groups which had previous-
ly been of the greatest importance, only two 
are currently of any relevance: those of Igor 
Kolomoyskiy and Rinat Akhmetov. The former, 
although he is currently at loggerheads with the 
president, remains one of the most important 
players on the Ukrainian political scene, among 
The opposition parties have been find-
ing it hard to pull themselves together in 
the present situation, and are committed 
to maintaining the status quo, and above 
all to freezing the party scene in its pres-
ent form. 
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other reasons because he has influence in many 
political parties. His support in the 2019 elections 
will cost a great deal, and he will be uninhibited 
about choosing the candidate he supports.
Akhmetov, who is still a semi-official support-
er of the Opposition Bloc, has been severely 
weakened both economically (including by the 
blockade of trade with the Donbas) and polit-
ically, and also because he was clearly unable 
to respond quickly and decisively; he has now 
been reduced to expecting a change in the se-
quence of events, instead of influencing it him-
self. He also lacks political ambition and ability, 
but remains a valuable source of funding for 
political projects.
From time to time the media circulate ru-
mours about the creation of new political 
parties, which are mainly assumed to cater to 
the pro-Russian and radical leftist electorates. 
It seems, however, that these now serve mainly 
to compromise projects that could jeopardise 
the Opposition Bloc on the one hand, or the 
ruling camp on the other; the latter does not 
want to create a political power that could ap-
peal to this electorate while having no links to 
the Yanukovych regime.
The other goal of the behind-the-scenes activ-
ities is to prevent the emergence of a strong 
grouping which would support reforming the 
country along European lines, and above all 
effectively fight corruption. The Revolution 
of Dignity has not led to the emergence of 
a strong political group which is genuinely 
capable of enforcing the programme it stood 
for. Meanwhile, the war has increased support 
for radical nationalists – both of the tradition-
al branch, who align themselves with the tra-
dition of the OUN (mainly the Svoboda party), 
and the new branch, who use the slogans of 
the contemporary radical European right (main-
ly the so-called Azov Movement). However, it 
will be easy to set these groups against each 
other as they try to build a common front, by 
playing on their policy differences and the am-
bitions of their leaders.
Prospects for the 2019 elections
Presidential elections should be held in Ukraine 
in March 2019, and parliamentary elections in 
October the same year. As a result, the prepa-
ration for both electoral campaigns is becom-
ing an increasingly important element of the 
political manoeuvres in Kyiv. There is no doubt 
that Petro Poroshenko will run for re-election; 
his main rival is Yulia Tymoshenko, who for 
a long time has had levels of support in opinion 
polls similar to those of the president, leaving 
the other politicians behind2. Consequently, we 
may expect attempts by the presidential camp 
to promote other radical populists, with the 
aim of breaking up Tymoshenko’s electorate. 
Any other attempt at a serious candidature 
can only come from a pro-European party. The 
inability to hold elections in Crimea and the 
separatist-controlled areas will deprive the pro- 
-Soviet and Communist presidential candidates 
of any hope.
At the moment, President Poroshenko’s main 
goal seems to be preventing parliamentary 
elections from being called early. This is why 
he has delayed the restoration of the legitima-
cy of the Central Electoral Commission (of its 
fifteen members, only two have not exceed-
ed their term in office), and postponed work 
on bills concerning the impeachment process 
and the new parliamentary electoral law (both 
were obligations included in the 2014 coalition 
agreement). The president wants to gain time 
– he is probably waiting for his opponents to 
make mistakes, especially potential competitors 
2 For example, in the Rating Group’s poll in December 
2016, Tymoshenko was supported by 10.6% of respond-
ents, Poroshenko by 8.8%; next came Yuriy Boyko with 
6.1%. 24% said they would not vote, and 15.3% were 
undecided.
Presidential elections should be held in 
Ukraine in March 2019, and parliamen-
tary elections in October the same year.
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within his own camp – while trying to provoke 
them into such errors.
Since February 2016, the government coalition 
has not had an absolute majority in parliament 
which is required by constitution3. In individu-
al votes, the BPP and the People’s Front have 
been supported by parties consisting of former 
members of the Party of Regions (apart from 
the Opposition Bloc) which are controlled by 
oligarchs, and by independent MPs. Conclud-
ing a formal coalition agreement with these 
groups might be acceptable to the BPP (though 
it would cause many deputies to leave and lead 
to a serious loss of image), but it would certain-
ly be unacceptable to the People’s Front, with-
out which no coalition could be formed.
However, the lack of the required number of 
formal coalition members (226 deputies, i.e. at 
least 50% of the constitutional members of par-
liament) undermines the legitimacy of both the 
3 As of 6 April, the Poroshenko Bloc has 141 deputies and 
the People’s Front 81, 4 short of the required majority 
of 226.
government and parliament itself. The Consti-
tution of Ukraine stipulates that the existence of 
such a coalition is mandatory; it does not allow 
for the rule of a minority government, and the 
lack of an agreed coalition is a premise for early 
elections (although the president has only the 
right, and not the obligation, to dissolve parlia-
ment). Although in the present situation early 
parliamentary elections appear to be a natural 
solution, nothing suggests they will imminently 
be called. The main reason for this seems to be 
that no party or bloc of parties can count on 
them bringing definite success. Postponing the 
parliamentary elections until the constitutional 
deadline gives practically all political forces (in-
cluding those aspiring to seats in parliament) 
both the time and the hope of increasing their 
support; in addition, parties that put up serious 
candidates in the preceding presidential elec-
tions will gain additional political benefits.
